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It was a great trip to Tijuana.  You got two cases of real vanillafor everyone on your Christmas list, a huge bunch of realMexican oregano, and a three-legged-pig clay sculpture to
finish off your newly renovated Spanish-style living room.
That pig was a great find.  Already it’s bringing you luck; there
is hardly a line to cross back into the States, and at this rate,
you will make it home in time to watch Boston Legal.
Unfortunately, it won’t work out that way.  The border agents
who are randomly pulling cars out of line, send you to the sec-
ondary inspection area.  While you chat with the agent, he
picks up the clay pig, and suddenly, he doesn’t seem friendly
any more.  The dog circling your car has just dipped his head
twice near your trunk, you are getting sweaty, and more agents
seem to be taking an interest in your car.  Before you know
what’s happening, the agent smashes the clay pig to look
inside.  Surely he can’t do that!  Surely this is an unreasonable
search . . . isn’t it?  Unfortunately, it is probably okay.
Recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided the
government can destroy personal property during a search at
the border without restraint or probable cause.1 The Ninth
Circuit’s holding in United States v. Cortez-Rocha2 represents a
dangerous precedent not only for border searches, but for the
reasonableness standard embedded in the Fourth
Amendment.3 However, this power should not eliminate all
Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable
searches.4 Although the federal government may have the abil-
ity to conduct searches without probable cause at the border,
that power does not allow federal agents to destroy personal
property when agents can open a container with minimal dam-
age and when no exigent circumstances exist.5
On February 16, 2003, Julio Cortez-Rocha (Cortez)
attempted to enter the United States from Mexico.6 During the
routine border questioning, customs agents became suspicious
of Cortez and sent him to a secondary inspection area.7 During
the search, the agents slashed open his spare tire, found several
bricks of marijuana, and arrested Cortez.8
The Ninth Circuit determined that a destructive search of
personal property at the border was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment even though the agents could have disas-
sembled or opened the container without destroying it.9 The
decision in Cortez-Rocha raises troubling questions about citi-
zens’ rights, the status of the Fourth Amendment at the border,
and the applicability of the exclusionary rule to border
searches.    
Constitutional protections are being restricted by the courts
in the name of justice and national security.  Although the gov-
ernment has a reasonable interest in regulating what crosses its
borders, individuals do not lose constitutional protections at the
border, and courts should affirm the substantial protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures.10 The Ninth Circuit
should have encouraged government agents to conduct their
investigations within the boundaries set by United States v.
Flores-Montano,11 rather than further weighting the balancing
test in favor of the government.12 Suppressing the marijuana in
the Cortez-Rocha case would not have prevented agents from
inspecting containers crossing the border.  Rather, the Ninth
Circuit should have held that the destruction of a container,
absent an additional justification, is particularly offensive and
Footnotes
1. United States v. Cortez-Rocha, 394 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2005).
2. Id. The court’s decision was initially rendered September 21, 2004
and reported at 383 F.3d 1093.  Nearly four months later, the court
supplemented its opinion with citation to a Prohibition-era deci-
sion upholding a warrantless search for contraband whiskey in an
automobile, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1924), and a
1982 case involving the warrantless search of an automobile dur-
ing a traffic stop, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); the
Ross case had cited Carroll. Carroll, but not Ross, is briefly cited
in the Supreme Court’s most recent case addressing border
searches of automobiles, United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S.
149, 154 (2004), but did not factor significantly into the court’s
analysis.  
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 618 n.13 (not deciding
whether “a border search might be deemed unreasonable because
of the particularly offensive manner in which it is carried out”);
Marsh v. United States, 344 F.3d 317, 324 (5th Cir. 1965) (“Border
searches are . . . not exempt from the constitutional test of rea-
sonableness.”).
5. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991); Florida v. Wells, 495
U.S. 1 (1990); United States v. Osage 235 F.3d 518 (10th Cir.
2000).
6. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 4, United States v. Cortez-Rocha. 
7. Brief for Appellee at 2-3, United States v. Cortez-Rocha.  
8. Id. at 2-3.
9. United States v. Cortez-Rocha, 394 F.3d 1115, 1125-26 (9th Cir.
2005).
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606,
618 n.13 (1977).
11. 541 U.S. 149 (2004).
12. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155-56 (2004)
(holding that reasonable suspicion may be required for the
destructive search of a operational or non-operational car-part
component).
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makes the search unreasonable.13 Instead of determining
whether the trial judge correctly admitted the evidence, the
Ninth Circuit held that the complete destruction of a person’s
property was not offensive, thereby further reducing an individ-
ual’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.14
There is no justification for protecting searches that com-
pletely destroy an object, regardless of the object’s value, when
there are nondestructive methods for opening it.15 Agents
have a lower threshold to meet to justify searches at the border
and the scope of those searches is nearly unlimited.  However,
the border search does not eliminate the restraint agents must
use when conducting the search.  Allowing federal customs
agents to destroy personal property when they can open the
container with minimal damage and common tools eliminates
all Fourth Amendment protections at the border.  
I.  CASE DESCRIPTION
Julio Cortez-Rocha (Cortez) attempted to enter the country
through the Calexico Port of Entry between California and
Mexico on February 16, 2003, while smuggling 42 kilograms
of marijuana in his spare tire.16 Border customs agents were
conducting a routine border check of Cortez’s 1979 Chevy
pickup and became suspicious when a drug dog signaled near
the gas tank of Cortez’s truck.17 Agents moved Cortez to a sec-
ondary inspection area, placed him in handcuffs, and con-
ducted a detailed search of his vehicle.18 They placed a density
meter against the spare tire, which registered a high reading.19
The agents put the truck on a hydraulic lift, removed the spare
tire, and slashed it open.20 The agents found 42.22 kilograms
of marijuana and arrested Cortez.21
On February 26, 2003, the government charged Cortez with
one count of importing marijuana and one count of possession
with the intent to distribute.22 Prior to trial, Cortez asserted
that “cutting open the spare tire . . . represented a ‘non-routine’
search that must be justified by reasonable, articulable suspi-
cion.”23 Further, Cortez argued that the government had not
established reasonable suspicion since it provided no evidence
13. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 618 n.13.
14. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 653 (1961); Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23, 34 (1963) (“[T]here is no formula for . . . reasonableness.
Each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances 
. . . .”). 
15. See United States v. Osage, 235 F.3d 518 (10th Cir. 2000).
16. United States v. Cortez-Rocha, 394 F.3d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir.
2005).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. Density busters measure the density of objects.  Id.; Appellant’s
Opening Brief at 4, United States v. Cortez-Rocha. Agents compare
the meter reading to an acceptable range for the object tested.  Id.
If the reading is “high,” the object is denser than normal and sug-
gests a strong probability there is a something hidden within the
object.  Id.
20. Cortez-Rocha, 394 F.3d at 1118.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 4, United States v. Cortez-Rocha.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 5.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 6.  
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. United States v. Cortez-Rocha, 394 F.3d 1115, 1126 (9th Cir.
2005).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
32. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983).  
33. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1967) (citations omit-
ted).  
34. Katz, 389 U.S. at 356-57.
35. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (quoting Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)).
36. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963).
37. E.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (admitting evi-
dence under “good-faith” exception); Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-
17 (1977) (holding border searches are reasonable by virtue of
their location); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (holding
a search during a custodial arrest is reasonable to prevent officer
from harm). 
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on the reliability of the dog or
the density buster.24 To sup-
port his suppression motion,
Cortez filed discovery
motions on the reliability of
the dog and density buster.25
The government coun-
tered that the search did not
require reasonable suspicion
since the search was a routine
border search and, therefore,
reasonable.26 Ultimately, the
trial court denied both
motions, determining that since the search was routine it did
not require reasonable suspicion and that the discovery motion
was moot.27 After the trial court denied his motion, Cortez
pleaded guilty to the importation of marijuana charge, condi-
tioned on his appeal of the suppression motion.28 The district
court sentenced Cortez to time served and two years proba-
tion.29 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Cortez’s convic-
tion.30
II.  BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment prevents the government from
conducting unreasonable searches and seizures without proba-
ble cause.31 Probable cause is a reasonable belief that the gov-
ernment will find evidence of a crime in a particular location.32
Typically, searches and seizures require a detached magistrate
to determine whether probable cause exists to support the gov-
ernment’s warrant request.33 If the magistrate finds probable
cause, the magistrate will issue a warrant.34 If the government
conducts a warrantless search, then a defendant may keep the
evidence out of the prosecutor’s case-in-chief presentation
through the exclusionary rule.35 However, several exceptions
to the warrant requirement allow the prosecutor to bring in
evidence obtained outside the warrant process.36 Each excep-
tion defines reasonableness differently.37
There is no 
justification for
protecting searches
that completely
destroy an object 
. . . when there
are nondestructive
methods for 
opening it.
38. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-17 (1977).  
39. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1984) (summariz-
ing several warrant-requirement exceptions).
40. “Interior” refers to searches or seizures within the United States’
borders. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 154.
41. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 622.  
42. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 154; United States v. Knight, 534 U.S. 112,
118-119 (2001) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295,
300 (1999)). 
43. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 3.4  (3d ed.
2000). 
44. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990).
45. See, e.g., Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (border crossings); United
States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985) (airports);
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (international mail).
46. LAFAVE, supra note 43 at 236.
47. See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155; Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 618,
n.13; Appellant’s Opening Brief at 11, United States v. Cortez-
Rocha.
48. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
49. 431 U.S. 606, 616-17 (1977).
50. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 624-25.  Point of entry into the United States
of property or persons is the functional equivalent of the border.
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-273 (1973).
51. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 272-273.
52. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 624-25.
53. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
54. 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
55. Balloon swallowers ingest condoms or balloons filled with drugs,
enter the country, and naturally expel the drugs at their destina-
tion.  Id. at 533.
56. Id. Hernandez claimed to be a buyer for a store in Columbia to
account for her frequent trips between Bogotá and Los Angeles.
Id. However, the lack of substantial luggage and hotel plans dis-
counted her story.  Id. 
57. Id. at 534.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 535-36.
60. Id. at 536-38.
61. Id. at 541, 543-44.
62. United States v. Des Jardins, 747 F.2d 499, 504 (1984) (citations
omitted); Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir.
1967).
63. Id.
A. Border Searches
The United States
Supreme Court has long con-
sidered border searches rea-
sonable without a finding of
probable cause by a detached
magistrate simply “by virtue
of the fact that they occur at
the border . . . .”38 The bor-
der-search reasonableness
definition is not rooted in the
“exigent circumstance”39 analysis used in interior40 Fourth
Amendment analyses.41 Rather, the long-standing exception
for border searches springs from the government’s interest in
regulating what enters the country by securing its borders from
unwanted contraband and preventing illegal immigration.42
Thus, border searches are more of a regulatory search, such as
an inventory search,43 and government agents are restricted in
the manner in which they carry out the search.44 The United
States Supreme Court has reaffirmed the border-search excep-
tion numerous times.45
The border-search exception allows for a search of the entire
vehicle and its containers without obtaining a search warrant
or establishing probable cause.46 However, the individual may
rebut the presumption of validity by showing agents con-
ducted the search in a particularly offensive manner.47 To
determine whether the government has exceeded its authority,
the court must use a balancing test to determine whether
agents conducted the search in a “manner which will conserve
public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual
citizens.”48
For example, in United States v. Ramsey49 the United States
Supreme Court held that an inspection of suspicious letters
was reasonable because the agent conducted the search when
the letters entered the country.50 The agent searched the letters
at the point of entry into the United States for the letters, the
functional equivalent of the border, 51 and the border exception
made the search reasonable.52
Although individuals have greater constitutional protec-
tions than their property, customs agents may still detain indi-
viduals, regardless of where they enter, for a reasonable
amount of time to determine whether they are smuggling con-
traband.53 In United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,54 customs
agents suspected that Rosa Montoya de Hernandez was a “bal-
loon swallower”55 because of the suspicious characteristics of
her story and dress.56 During a pat-down and strip search,
agents noticed Hernandez’s abdomen was firm and that she
was wearing two pairs of elastic underwear.57 Agents gave
Hernandez the option to have an x-ray or wait until she had a
bowel movement so they could determine what was in her
abdomen.58 After 16 hours, agents obtained a court order for
a rectal exam and discovered 88 balloons filled with cocaine.59
Hernandez moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that
the search was unreasonable as it violated her privacy and dig-
nity and that the government did not obtain a warrant until
after she had been detained for 16 hours.60 The United States
Supreme Court considered the detention to be “routine” since
agents confined Hernandez until they could determine
whether she was smuggling drugs.61 Defining the agents’
search of Hernandez as routine would lead courts to extend the
same analysis to property searched at the border.
B. The Ninth Circuit and the Routine/Non-Routine
Analytical Framework
The Ninth Circuit has consistently held that agents must
conduct border searches in a reasonable manner.62 In 1967,
1970, and 1984, the court held that the government does not
need probable cause to initiate a border search but the agent
must “proceed in a reasonable manner” and support more-
intrusive searches with “some level of suspicion.”63 The appel-
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The border-search
exception allows
for a search of the
entire vehicle and
its contents without
obtaining a search
warrant . . . .
late courts developed a test to evaluate the intrusiveness of a
border search through the routine/non-routine analysis based
on Montoya de Hernandez. 64
The Ninth Circuit extended the routine/non-routine analy-
sis to border vehicle searches in United States v. Molina-
Tarazon.65 The Ninth Circuit held that removing the gas tank
from a vehicle to inspect its interior was not routine and, there-
fore, required particularized suspicion.66 In Molina-Tarazon,
the agents became suspicious of Molina’s truck and searched it
to determine whether he had concealed drugs in the truck.67
The search was inconclusive.68 Unsatisfied, the agents directed
the truck to the inspection area.69 The mechanic put the truck
on a lift and removed the gas tank.70 After disassembling the
tank, the mechanic discovered drugs.71
The Ninth Circuit held that the border-search exception was
reasonable for routine searches, creating a three-part analysis
to determine whether or not the search was routine.72 The
three-part test required an evaluation of the amount of force
used, the danger the search posed, and the effect of the search
on the individual.73 After determining that the search was
non-routine, the court found that the agents established rea-
sonable suspicion prior to removing the gas tank.74 Since the
agents had established reasonable suspicion to conduct the
non-routine search, the court held the search was reasonable.75
Prior to Cortez-Rocha, the Ninth Circuit had considered that
slashing a spare tire was a routine search under the Molina-
Tarazon test in United States v. Vargas-Castillo.76 In Vargas-
Castillo, customs agents referred the defendant’s vehicle to a
secondary inspection area after becoming suspicious of the
vehicle.77 Based on the evidence established during the sec-
ondary inspection, a customs agent made a small incision into
the tire, discovered marijuana, and then cut the tire completely
open to uncover the rest of the drugs.78
In Vargas-Castillo, the Ninth Circuit answered a hypotheti-
cal question since neither party raised the suppression issue at
trial nor did the court cite any authority to allow it to address
the issue on appeal.79 Additionally, the appellate court did not
determine whether slashing the tire was routine or whether
agents had established sufficient reasonable suspicion to con-
duct the search.80 Thus, the
Ninth Circuit used a
routine/non-routine analysis
to determine whether property
searches conducted at the bor-
der were reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment and sug-
gested that slashing a tire
might be a reasonable search.81
C. United States v. Flores-
Montano’s Effect on
Border Searches
In United States v. Flores-Montano,82 the United States
Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s routine/non-routine
balancing test.83 The facts in Flores-Montano were similar to
those in Molina-Tarazon.84 After suspecting that Flores’s gas
tank contained drugs, the agents sent the car to a secondary
inspection area, put it on a lift, and summoned a mechanic to
disassemble the gas tank.85 After agents removed the tank, they
noticed an extra plate attached to the top of the tank with
bondo.86 The agents knocked off the plate and discovered the
hidden marijuana.87
Flores-Montano contains two important holdings for border
searches.  First, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed
that the government does not have to establish probable cause
to conduct a border search and that the scope of a property bor-
der search is unlimited.88 Second, the government may remove,
inspect, and replace any operational part of the vehicle without
probable cause or judicial oversight when the government can
accomplish the process in a reasonable amount of time and with
little or repairable damage to the vehicle.89 Although Flores-
Montano eliminated Molina-Tarazon’s balancing test, 90 it did not
clarify what amount of destruction makes a search unreason-
able.91
On the facts presented, the Court determined the hour the
agents required to summon the mechanic, complete the disas-
sembly, search the tank, and reassemble the car was not unrea-
sonable.92 The Court remanded the case but refused to deter-
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64. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 124 S. Ct. 1582, 1584-85
(2004).
65. 279 F.3d 709 (9th Cir. 2002).
66. United States v. Molina-Tarazon, 279 F.3d 709, 712 (9th Cir. 2002)
overruled in part, United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149,
151-52 (2004).
67. Molina-Tarazon, 279 F.3d at 711.
68. Molina-Tarazon, 279 F.3d at 712.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 713.  The court acknowledged that there may be additional
factors that would add to the analysis. Id.
73. Id. at 713-16.
74. Id. at 717-18.
75. Id. at 717-18.
76. 329 F.3d 715, 722-23 (9th Cir. 2003).
77. Id. at 717.  
78. Id.
79. See id.; Appellant’s Opening Brief at 17, Cortez-Rocha.
80. Id.
81. See Vargas-Castillo, 329 F.3d at 722-23; United States v. Molina-
Tarazon, 279 F.3d 709, 713 (9th Cir. 2002).
82. 541 U.S. 149 (2004).  
83. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004).
84. See id. at 150-51; Molina-Tarazon, 279 F.3d at 711-12.
85. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 151.
86. Id. Bondo is “a putty-like hardening substance that is used to seal
openings . . .” Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 153.
89. Id. at 154-55 (commenting the search took approximately one
hour and suggesting that a wait of two hours to enter the country
would not be unreasonable).
90. Id. at 152-53. 
91. Id. at 154 n.2 (refusing to discuss what type of manner might
make a search unreasonable).
92. Id. at 155.
Although Flores-
Montano
eliminated [the]
balancing test, it
did not clarify
what amount of
destruction makes
a search 
unreasonable.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See supra notes 33-39.
96. Id.
97. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 618 n.13 (1977).
98. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990).
99. See e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998) (holding
that reasonable suspicion suspect was armed and dangerous sup-
ported exigent circumstances to justify seizure); United States v.
Bennett, 363 F.3d 947, 952 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding agents had
established probable cause to justify destructive search); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (holding that reasonable
suspicion justified slashing into car upholstery).  
100. See e.g., United States v. Rivas, 157 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 1998)
(holding the government did not establish reasonable suspicion
to justify drilling).  Cf. United States v. Osage, 235 F.3d 518 (10th
Cir. 2000) (holding the officer did not have sufficient reasonable
suspicion to exceed the scope of consent by destroying the con-
tainer).
101. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004);
United States v. Pena, 920 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding
that removing a vent cover is a nondestructive search); United
States v. Torres, 663 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding that
using a screwdriver to remove a panel is a nondestructive
search).  See cf. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1990) (forcing
open container absent existing police procedures was an unrea-
sonable search).
102. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153.  A similar search would currently fall
under the automobile exception.  
103. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162.
104. See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 154 n. 2.
105. Bennett, 363 F.3d at 952; Rivas, 157 F.3d 364; United States v.
Weinbender, 109 F.3d 1327, 1329 (8th Cir. 1997); Robles, 45 F.3d
1; Carreon, 872 F.2d 1436.
106. See, e.g., Rivas, 157 F.3d at 367; Robles, 45 F.3d at 5.
107. Compare Rivas, 1257 F.3d at 368 (holding the government did
not meet its burden to establish reasonable suspicion) with
Robles, 45 F.3d at 5 (holding the government met its burden of
reasonable suspicion).
108. Id.
109. See cases cited supra note 37.
110. See, e.g., Bennett, 363 F.3d at 952 (holding that agents had estab-
lished probable cause to justify search).
111. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 605, 618, n. 13 (1977).
112. 541 U.S. 149.
113. Compare Appellant’s Opening Brief, United States v. Cortez-
Rocha Brief for Appellee, United States v. Cortez-Rocha with
Appellant’s Reply Brief, United States v. Cortez-Rocha.
mine what level of destruction
during a search made it unrea-
sonable.93 Thus, although the
United States Supreme Court
overruled the routine/non-
routine balancing test, it did
not determine what level of
destruction makes a border
search unreasonable.94
D.  Defining Reasonable
Manner in Destruction of Property
Reasonableness has different standards depending on the
type, location, and circumstances of the search.95 Government
agents may establish reasonableness through exigent circum-
stances or by developing additional reasonable suspicion to
widen the scope of the search.96 However, a search may
become unreasonable depending on the manner in which
agents conduct the search97 or when the scope of the search
exceeds the basis for the search.98
In federal cases where a court has determined the govern-
ment established reasonable suspicion beyond the justification
for the initial search, it has admitted evidence obtained
through destructive searches.99 Conversely, courts have sup-
pressed the evidence when the government failed to show suf-
ficient reasonable suspicion to justify the destructive search.100
Additionally, courts have admitted evidence uncovered during
a nondestructive search.101
For example, the United States Supreme Court has held that
agents conducted a reasonable search when they slashed open
the interior of a car to determine whether suspects had hidden
contraband in the seats because the government had established
reasonable suspicion during the search.102 Thus, although the
manner of the search may appear unreasonable, the courts deter-
mined the agents established reasonable suspicion to widen the
scope of the search and did not base the reasonableness of the
search on the probable cause to stop the car.103
Additionally, the majority of federal appellate courts to
address destructive border searches have required the govern-
ment to establish reasonable suspicion before destroying a con-
tainer while conducting an otherwise reasonable search.104 In
each of the cases, the government drilled small holes or made
small incisions to determine the contents of the “container.”105
These cases presented the question whether the government
had conducted a routine or non-routine search based on the
interpretation of Montoya de Hernandez.106 However, where
courts allowed the evidence, it determined the agents had
established reasonable suspicion to believe the container con-
tained contraband.107 By establishing reasonable suspicion,
the agents were able to justify the continued intrusion into the
property and greater latitude to conduct the drilling.108
Even though reasonableness is a shifting standard, the gov-
ernment can conduct a wide array of searches through a war-
rant-requirement exception.109 Further, when in doubt,
obtaining a warrant gives an agent great latitude to conduct a
seemingly unreasonable search.110
III.  ANALYSIS
A.  Parties’ Arguments
United States v. Cortez-Rocha required the Ninth Circuit to
determine whether the destructive force used to open the spare
tire was unreasonable under Ramsey111 and Flores-Montano.112
After the government submitted its brief, the United States
Supreme Court ruled on Flores-Montano, which required the
parties to adjust their arguments.113 The Ninth Circuit ruled
that Flores-Montano applied only to operational parts of the
32 Court Review  
Reasonableness
has different 
standards 
depending on the
type, location, and
circumstances of
the search.
130. See id. at 2-4.
131. Brief for Appellee at 4.
132. Id. at 8-10.
133. Id. at 8-11 (citing United States v. Ramos-Saenz, 36 F.3d 59 (9th
Cir. 1994) (limiting non-routine searches to body or strip
searches and holding the destructive force to remove the sole of
the shoe was reasonable); United States v. Most 789 F.2d 1411
(9th Cir. 1986) (inserting a beeper into a paperweight was a rea-
sonable search). 
134. Brief for Appellee at 15-17 (citing United States v. Puig, 810 F.2d
1085, 1086-87 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that drilling a small
hole into the hull of ship which could easily be repaired was rea-
sonable); United States v. Sarda-Villa, 760 F.2d 1232 (11th Cir.
1985) (holding that “reasonable suspicion justified using an axe
and a crowbar” to search underneath the deck for drugs); United
States v. Moreno, 778 F.2d 719, 721 (11th Cir. 1985) (drilling
two small holes in a gas tank to insert a probe to determine the
contents was a reasonable border search). 
vehicle and not to non-operational parts of the vehicle.114
Therefore, the holding in Flores-Montano did not cover the
destructive search of the spare tire.115 This ruling was wrong
because it ignored United States Supreme Court precedent
requiring the Fourth Amendment to be “liberally construed” to
preserve the integrity of Constitutional protections116 and
because of the offensive manner of the search.117 Finally, the
Ninth Circuit’s decision ignored analogous United States
Supreme Court precedent and similar interpretations of other
circuit courts requiring agents to establish reasonable suspi-
cion before conducting destructive searches of property.118
1.  Julio Cortez-Rocha
During the course of the appeal, the United States Supreme
Court ruled on United States v. Flores-Montano,119 which
changed the emphasis of the parties’ arguments.  Initially, Cortez
argued that slashing the spare tire was a non-routine search
because the search completely destroyed the container.120
Additionally, Cortez argued the destruction of the tire signifi-
cantly reduced his sense of safety and caused him to be fearful
of completing his journey without a spare tire.121 Cortez’s last
argument in his opening brief attempted to discount the holding
from United States v. Vargas-Castillo, since the Ninth Circuit had
refused to consider the suppression motion because the parties
had not raised the issue at trial.122 Cortez’s arguments all con-
tained the same theme: the Fourth Amendment protects indi-
viduals against “unreasonable destruction of property,” regard-
less of whether the seizure occurs at the border or inside the
country and that any destructive force used during a search
requires agents to establish reasonable suspicion or lose the evi-
dence to the exclusionary rule.123
Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Flores-Montano, which struck down the routine/non-routine
analysis, 124 Cortez revised his argument. Cortez argued that
slashing the spare tire was the kind of destructive force the
United States Supreme Court suggested was unreasonable.125
However, in Flores-Montano the Court specifically refused to
identify the level of destruction that would make an otherwise
legal search unreasonable by the manner in which agents con-
ducted the search.126
Incorporating Flores-
Montano into his reply brief,
Cortez contended that a
destructive search required
individualized suspicion and
that Flores-Montano did not
address whether a destructive
search was unreasonable.127
Cortez further asserted that
although the routine/non-
routine framework had been
eliminated, the United States Supreme Court did not hold that
an individual loses all possessory interests in property, or that
a Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis was elimi-
nated.128 Cortez urged the Ninth Circuit to join the majority
of circuits requiring that government agents establish reason-
able suspicion before using destructive force to carry out a bor-
der search.129 Finally, Cortez requested that the court suppress
the evidence since the government could have obtained it
using other “least-intrusive” means.130
2.  United States
The government argued that the ruling in United States v.
Vargas-Castillo was binding and asserted that the holding of
that case classified the cutting open of a spare tire as a routine
search that did not require reasonable suspicion.131
Additionally, the government focused on limiting Montoya de
Hernandez to the intrusive search of a person and argued that
the balancing test established in Molina-Tarazon was inconsis-
tent with Montoya de Hernandez.132
Further, the government identified several cases within the
Ninth Circuit and from other circuits in which courts had held
that minimal destructive force was reasonable and routine
when the government conducted the search at the border.133
For example, the government argued that the Eleventh Circuit
has allowed searches, initially using minimal destructive force,
to destroy large portions of a boat during a border search.134
Finally, the government cited cases in the Seventh and Tenth
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circuits, in which minimal
destructive force to establish
the contents of luggage or a
camper shell and in which both
circuits determined that the
searches were reasonable bor-
der searches.135
The government concluded
that by limiting Montoya de
Hernandez’s routine/non-rou-
tine analysis to body searches
and strip searches, the United
States Supreme Court permit-
ted the government greater
freedom to use some destruc-
tive force to carry out a border
search.136 The government requested that Cortez’s conviction
stand because the search of the tire was reasonable and that
Montoya de Hernandez did not apply to property searches.137
B.  Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Majority Opinion
The Ninth Circuit specifically distinguished Flores-Montano
as pertaining only to the vehicle itself.138 According to the
majority, because the spare tire was unnecessary for immediate
travel and destruction of the spare tire did not damage or
destroy the vehicle, the search was reasonable, and no cause or
suspicion was necessary to search the spare tire.139 Although a
destructive search of property may require reasonable suspi-
cion, the Ninth Court held that since the United States
Supreme Court had focused its analysis on the vehicle, the
spare tire was not significant enough to be protected.140
Further, the court held that it was unworkable to require
agents to establish reasonable suspicion before opening any
locked container and that to do so would impair the govern-
ment’s ability to protect its border.141 Additionally, the Ninth
Circuit distinguished the “drilling cases”142 as irrelevant
because those cases were based on a similar routine/non-rou-
tine determination specifically overruled in Flores-Montano.143
The court justified its position as adhering to the admoni-
tion from the United States Supreme Court in Flores-Montano
to avoid creating additional balancing tests to determine rea-
sonableness.144 The court noted the spare tire was a favored
smuggling area for both drug runners and terrorists.145 The
court suggested that accepting Cortez’s argument would
encourage smugglers to conceal contraband in the spare tire
and allow contraband and terrorists into the country
unchecked.146 Finally, the court held that although the search
may have resulted in a constitutional tort or taking, the agents’
actions were not severe enough to justify suppressing the evi-
dence.147 The majority implicitly decided that a civil suit
against the government was a sufficient remedy for the com-
plete destruction of the tire.148 The Ninth Circuit determined
that the search was reasonable and affirmed the guilty plea.149
C.  Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Sidney Thomas argued the
majority had created an overbroad and unnecessary power
within the border-search exception.150 Judge Thomas
anchored his opinion on the United States Supreme Court
acknowledgment that the facts in Flores-Montano showed that
the search was nondestructive and that a destructive search
may lead to a different result.151 Since the search in Cortez-
Rocha was completely destructive, Judge Thomas argued that
the existing totality-of-the-circumstances test was the appro-
priate test.152 The dissent identified three factors to consider
in the analysis: “the degree of destruction, the ease [of repair],
and the convenience, cost, and efficiency of non-destructive or
less-destructive methods that were available . . . .”153 Applying
his method, Judge Thomas determined the agents should have
established reasonable cause before cutting into the tire.154
Judge Thomas next attacked the majority’s characterization
of the tire as a nonessential component of a vehicle since the
spare tire is a safety feature.155 Finally, Judge Thomas warned
against the majority’s war-on-terrorism justification stating,
“[t]he challenge in such times is not to allow our fear to over-
come our values.”156
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COMMENTARY
Constitutional protections do not evaporate at the border.157
Although the government may have broad power to conduct
general searches at the border, this power should not allow the
destruction of personal property when nondestructive meth-
ods exist to open the container.158 The Ninth Circuit wrongly
protected the evidence for trial to supposedly avoid creating
another balancing test.159 However, the Ninth Circuit failed to
recognize that all Fourth Amendment cases are balancing tests,
and suppressing the evidence would not have created a new
exception or protected area.160 Rather, the Ninth Circuit
would have affirmed that Fourth Amendment protections do
exist at the border.  Instead, Cortez-Rocha represents a quiet,
yet dangerous erosion of Fourth Amendment protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The decision in Cortez-Rocha was wrong for three reasons.
First, the Ninth Circuit ignored United States Supreme Court
precedent that requires Fourth Amendment protections be lib-
erally construed to preserve the integrity of the Constitution.161
Second, the Ninth Circuit failed to conduct a reasonable-suspi-
cion analysis even though it had conducted a reasonable-suspi-
cion analysis to justify a “potentially destructive” border search
prior to Cortez-Rocha.162 Finally, analogous United States
Supreme Court decisions and decisions from other federal cir-
cuits do not support the Ninth Circuit’s holding.163
The first error committed by the Ninth Circuit was its fail-
ure to conduct a balancing test to evaluate the search.164 The
court must interpret the Fourth Amendment in favor of the
individual rather than the government.165 When applying the
Fourth Amendment to the facts, the government must prove
either that probable cause existed to conduct the search or that
the search fell within a well-delineated exception.166 Because
the United States Supreme Court has twice avoided the deci-
sion of whether a destructive search is reasonable,167 the
boundaries of the border exception are blurry and the pre-
sumption should have gone to the individual rather than the
government.168 By resolving the “tie” in favor of the govern-
ment, the Ninth Circuit violated precedent and further
reduced Fourth Amendment
protections at the border.169
Expanding searches at the
border creates the possibility
for abuse that falls outside the
scope of judicial review.170
Absent a judicial ruling sup-
porting Fourth Amendment
protections, the Ninth Circuit
has created a dangerous
precedent for future cases
regarding the government’s ability to destroy property at the
border.  The spare tire in this case is not the concern.  Under
the authority of Cortez-Rocha, an agent could destroy a three-
legged clay pig to conduct a search for no reason other than the
laziness of an agent.  Further, Cortez-Rocha suggests that the
court would not suppress the evidence obtained in an offensive
search.  
To justify the search, the Ninth Circuit did not need to con-
duct a complex analysis.171 It could have adopted the test
urged by Cortez himself: whether the entire situation, condi-
tions, and actions of the agents sufficiently established reason-
able suspicion to justify the destruction of his property.172
Using a totality-of-the-circumstances approach would allow a
court to evaluate whether agents established sufficient cause to
use destructive force to open the container.173 Agents should
be required to attempt to open the container without employ-
ing destructive force.174 If the container is completely closed,
the officer should be required to establish reasonable suspicion
before causing any damage to the property.175
Such a test acknowledges existing precedent that allows
government agents to conduct exploratory drilling into
camper shells or to open packages entering the country.176 In
those cases, the courts evaluated the evidence the officer had
and determined that the officer had articulable facts to support
a reasonable suspicion for the exploratory drilling.177 This
essential analysis was missing in Cortez-Rocha.178 Failing to
conduct the reasonable suspicion analysis, regardless of the
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initial justification for the
search, defeats the purpose
of judicial oversight.179
Thus, the trial court and
the Ninth Circuit failed to
perform their constitu-
tional function.  
The Ninth Circuit also
erred in its decision when
it held, against its own
precedent, that reasonable
suspicion was not required when conducting a potentially
destructive search.180 The Ninth Circuit did not acknowledge
that it reviews a district court’s “determination of the legality of
a search de novo.”181 By raising the issue of a destructive
search pretrial and requesting the district court to conduct an
evidentiary hearing, Cortez preserved the issue for review.182
De novo review required the Ninth Circuit to apply existing
precedent to the Cortez case.183 By failing to conduct a rea-
sonable-suspicion analysis, the Ninth Circuit violated the rule
of stare decisis and incorrectly applied existing law.  The Ninth
Circuit error has two facets.  First, the Ninth Circuit failed to
distinguish United States v. Bennett from the facts in Cortez-
Rocha, which creates an inconsistency in the Ninth Circuit.
Instead, the Ninth Circuit cited Bennett to acknowledge that a
destructive search may be offensive and, therefore, unreason-
able without acknowledging that in Bennett the court found
reasonable suspicion to conduct an arguably destructive
search.184 Failing to distinguish Bennett from Cortez-Rocha
deprives district courts a clear interpretation to use in similar
cases. 
Second, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly applied United States
v. Vargas-Castillo.185 The Ninth Circuit cited Vargas-Castillo to
demonstrate that the search of a spare tire did not rise to the
level of intrusiveness to make a search unreasonable.186 The
Ninth Circuit erred by citing Vargas-Castillo, a legal justifica-
tion that the United States Supreme Court rejected in Flores-
Montano.187 In Vargas-Castillo, the Ninth Circuit merely deter-
mined that had Vargas raised the issue at trial, it would have
found slashing the tire open to be a routine and reasonable
search.188 Thus, the precedent cited should have been unavail-
able to the court to use as support for its conclusion.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly justified the entire
search based on the border-search exception without deter-
mining whether or not the manner of the search was reason-
able.189 The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that
the touchstone of any Fourth Amendment analysis is reason-
ableness.190 Reasonableness requires a probable-cause deter-
mination by a detached magistrate unless it falls within one of
the few well-delineated exceptions.191 The border search is
one of those exceptions.192 However, a border search is simi-
lar to a regulatory search, such as an inventory search, there-
fore restricting agents in the manner in which they carry out a
search.193 Excessive destruction can make an otherwise legal
search unreasonable under both United States v. Ramsey194 and
United States v. Ramirez.195 The question is what level of
destruction is reasonable?196 The government cannot justify
the destruction of the spare tire without an additional finding
of reasonable suspicion.  
The slashing of the tire was excessive and unnecessary.  It
was reasonable for the border agents to conduct an extensive
search of the vehicle because Cortez was attempting to enter
the country.197 Border agents were entitled to use force to
remove the spare tire from its secured location on the vehicle
under the Flores-Montano analysis.198 Under Flores-Montano,
agents would have been within the boundaries of the Fourth
Amendment to call a mechanic to the scene to dismount the
tire from the wheel, or if properly trained, to dismount the tire
themselves since the search would have been nondestructive.
However, instead of proceeding with caution and restraint, the
agents slashed open the tire to ascertain its contents and
destroyed the tire beyond repair.199 The United States Supreme
Court’s dicta in Ramsey and Flores-Montano regarding the
potential unreasonableness of a search caused by the destruc-
tion of property is not limited to the operational parts of a
vehicle, but rather to property as an entire class.200
The Ninth Circuit erred by failing to consider the evaluation
of destructive force in other federal appellate decisions.  A
comparison of similar cases from other jurisdictions demon-
strates that the Ninth Circuit’s holding is inconsistent with
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United State Supreme Court precedent and other circuit
courts.201 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit’s holding is inconsis-
tent with the balancing test used to determine the reasonable-
ness of a regulatory search.202 Comparing these holdings
demonstrates the Ninth Circuit unnecessarily increased the
exceptions to the reasonableness requirement.  
The Ninth Circuit dismissively rejected other circuit opin-
ions without carefully considering the holdings or fact pat-
terns.203 When the other circuits admitted evidence from
destructive searches, the courts held that reasonable suspicion
justified the destructive force.204 The United States Supreme
Court’s rejection of the routine/non-routine analysis is imma-
terial because the circuit courts employed reasonable suspicion
in analyzing destructive searches.205 While the border-search
exception justified the initial stop, the court found reasonable
suspicion to allow the destructive search.206
The failure of the Ninth Circuit to see the reasonable-suspi-
cion determination in the other circuits’ opinions demon-
strates that the Ninth Circuit unnecessarily dismissed persua-
sive authority.  Considering the holdings from the other cir-
cuits and the specific findings of reasonable suspicion to jus-
tify the exploratory drilling, the agents in Cortez-Rocha should
have limited the amount of destructive force used to dis-
mounting the tire or making a small repairable incision.207
The agents could have dismounted the tire without using
destructive force and accomplished the search, which would
have been as reasonable as removing the lid from a container
or opening the folds of a paper bag.208
The Ninth Circuit was thus obligated to find reasonable sus-
picion to justify the destructive search or to justify the destruc-
tive search based on the agents’ safety or the likelihood that the
evidence would disappear.209 The court could have accom-
plished this analysis by determining whether the search was
subject to the automobile exception or whether it was subject
to the limitations of a regulatory search.
The automobile exception, justified by the ease evidence
can be moved, would have been unavailable.  For all practical
purposes, Cortez was detained.  He was handcuffed and being
held away from his vehicle.210 His vehicle was in a secondary-
inspection area, removed from the main entry point into the
country.211 Further, the government was exercising complete
control over the vehicle, and there was no reason to believe
that Cortez’s truck would be stolen or that the evidence would
disappear.212 Thus, the agents could have easily called in a
telephone warrant and established probable cause for a
detached magistrate to issue a warrant to open the tire.213
Alternatively, the government could have justified the search
during the suppression motion both on the border exception
for the initial search and reasonable suspicion to believe that
contraband existed in the tire to justify the slashing open of the
tire.214
Because the Ninth Circuit ignored Fourth Amendment
interpretation precedent, its own border-search precedent, and
analogous case law from the United States Supreme Court and
other circuits, the Ninth Circuit unnecessarily fashioned a new
rule of law.  The Ninth Circuit had multiple tools to admit the
evidence without creating a dangerous precedent for future
border searches.  Because the Ninth Circuit failed to use these
tools, it reduced the constitutional protections at the border
without sufficient justification.
IV.  CONCLUSION
The rejection of the non-routine/routine analysis in Flores-
Montano requires courts to reevaluate their assessment of bor-
der searches.  Cases prior to Cortez-Rocha have allowed
searches when agents cause some, but repairable, damage to an
individual’s property.  However, the facts in Cortez-Rocha
demonstrate the search exceeded the bounds of reason when
agents completely destroyed the tire.  It is reasonable to expect
agents to use only the amount of force necessary to conduct
the search.215 Any force greater than necessary to safely open
the container is unreasonable per se and courts should sup-
press the evidence obtained from a destructive search absent
an additional finding of reasonable suspicion.216
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